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Abstract The rapid rise of an innovative private manufacturing economy in China
challenges standard economic explanations of growth, which typically assume the exis-
tence of well-deﬁned formal institutions such as property rights and company laws safe-
guarding investor and creditor interests. We highlight the social structure of cooperation
that enables innovative activity in private manufacturing ﬁrms when formal property
rights protection remains weak. We show how network effects linked to inter-ﬁrm coop-
eration in industrial clusters allowed private entrepreneurs to quickly develop reliable
business norms to reduce the inherent risk of malfeasance and contract breach in formal
and informal collaborative efforts. Survey data from a sample of 700 manufacturing ﬁrms
located in China’s Yangzi Delta region conﬁrms that both formal and informal types of
inter-ﬁrm collaboration are effective, though in different areas of innovative activity.
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Introduction
The size and competitiveness of China’s private-ﬁrm economy is a puzzle that
challenges standard economic explanations of entrepreneurial development and
economic growth. State-owned enterprises and state-controlled public corporations,
many listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, have enjoyed most-
favored treatment since the start of economic reforms in 1978. Indeed, their dominant
position in the economy reinforces the global perception of state capitalism as the
form of economy that has evolved in China. Yet despite such perception, and
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persistent discrimination against private enterprise as an organizational form, the
most robust sector of the Chinese economy has been the private sector, which has
outperformed the heavily subsidized state-owned and mixed-ownership companies.
Our aim is to show how network effects linked to inter-ﬁrm cooperation in research
and development have contributed to the rise of an innovation-driven private
manufacturing economy.
Despite ineffective intellectual property rights protection, placing China 59th
globally (comparable to Romania and Liberia; see IPRI, 2013), and limited access
to R&D funding from government, private manufacturers are closing the gap
with state-owned ﬁrms in research and development output (Jefferson et al, 2003;
Nee et al, 2010). In 2012, 29 per cent of patent applications were submitted by
private ﬁrms and 44 per cent by state-controlled and state-owned companies (China
Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology, 2013, p. 56). Private companies
registered 34 per cent of new products brought to market in 2012, whereas state-
owned enterprises and state-controlled companies were responsible for 44 per cent.
What explains private-ﬁrm R&D productivity closing the innovation gap with
larger state-owned ﬁrms and public corporations? We argue that the ‘bottom-up’
construction of economic institutions in geographically concentrated industrial
clusters has enabled private companies to circumvent formidable barriers to market
entry, weak legal enforcement of contracts, and discriminatory state policies to
move up the technological ladder through network effects of cooperative strategies
in the diffusion of innovative activity. Our evidence draws on more than 130
qualitative interviews with CEOs of ﬁrms, and quantitative ﬁrm-level evidence
from three waves of the Yangzi Delta Private Entrepreneur and Firm Survey
(conducted in 2006, 2009 and 2012) with a random sample of 700 private
companies (Nee and Opper, 2012).
First, we discuss the related organizational literature highlighting the role of inter-
ﬁrm cooperation and alliances in the production of innovation. Then we discuss
network effects driving intensiﬁcation of innovative activity in densely-populated
business communities. Our focus is on the development of a diversiﬁed portfolio of
inter-ﬁrm cooperation, informal and formal, which entrepreneurs devise to meet the
needs of speciﬁc tasks and risks inherent in a broad spectrum of innovative activities.
Finally, estimation results quantifying the impact of different forms of inter-ﬁrm
cooperation on a range of innovative activities conﬁrm a close link between form of
collaboration and innovative success.
Innovation as a Social Process
Insofar as innovation is a social process involving both cooperation and competition,
innovations rarely emerge in isolation. Research on innovation conﬁrms that
technical change is facilitated through reliance on inter-ﬁrm cooperation across
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a wide spectrum of industries (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1994; Shan et al, 1994;
Gulati, 1998; Stuart, 1998, 2000; Ahuja, 2000). In advanced industrial economies,
it is common practice for ﬁrms to enter into cooperative contracts for research and
development to share research capabilities and knowledge, in order to take advantage
of economies of scale among key players, while limiting market access to rival
ﬁrms not in the research network (Porter and Fuller, 1986; Pisano et al, 1988).
A related motive for ﬁrms to cooperate stems from interest in minimizing and
sharing the uncertainties inherent in R&D, especially in high-technology industries
where the technical knowledge required for innovations is at the frontiers of
different scientiﬁc ﬁelds and entails complexities that no ﬁrm can afford to internalize
in its R&D department (Mowery, 1988; Obleros and MacDonald, 1988). Firms
participate in strategic alliances in R&D in order to gain access to other ﬁrms’
technologies, exercise control over market entry, open new market niches through
joint product development, and reduce the time-span required for innovations and
their market entry (Porter and Fuller, 1986; Mowery, 1988; Pisano et al, 1988;
Hagedoorn, 1993).
Research on the American biotechnology industry, for example, underscores the
dynamics of cooperation as a learning process endogenous to the industry, in which
technological development fosters network effects. Such effects involve mechanisms
of network externalities, social learning, and normative inﬂuence, which stem from
the increasing utility of cooperation for ﬁrms participating in collaborative R&D
projects. ‘Once a ﬁrm begins collaborating, it develops experience at cooperation and
a reputation as a partner. Over time, ﬁrms develop capabilities for interacting with
other ﬁrms … Firms with access to a more diverse set of activities and those with
more experience at collaborating are better able to locate themselves in information-
rich positions… Put colloquially, a ﬁrm grows by being a player; it does not become
a player by growing’ (Powell et al, 1996, pp. 120–121). In biotechnology, formal
contractual agreements to cooperate in research and development is the tip of the
iceberg in an even larger and more dispersed informal network of cooperative
arrangements between ﬁrms. ‘Beneath most formal ties, then, lies a sea of informal
relations’ (Powell et al, 1996, p. 120) that accumulate over time as ﬁrms move from
one formal R&D collaboration to another, resulting in informal network connections
that offer a continuing source of beneﬁts beyond any particular exchange. Because
the locus of innovative activity is embedded in inter-ﬁrm networks, the boundaries
between ﬁrms and research universities become blurred, which in turn promotes
timely and effective diffusion of new technologies in the biotechnology industry.
In sum, the organizational literature suggests that to understand where innovations
come from, it is important to move beyond the study of the individual entrepreneur
and ﬁrm to specify network effects in innovation activity. The importance of
arrangements such as non-price exchanges and network effects (social learning,
normative inﬂuence and network externalities) in facilitating ﬁrm-based research and
development is beyond doubt.
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Collocation and Network Effects
Much organizational analysis of cooperation strategies in research and development
draws on research activities in advanced industrial economies. Because cooperation
in R&D involves speciﬁc risks, well-speciﬁed property rights (including intellectual
property rights, contract law, corporate law, and arbitration institutions guiding and
safeguarding economic transactions) are assumed as implicit background conditions,
not part of the actual analysis. But how do innovation networks operate in the
absence of the institutional conditions present in high-income economies such as the
United States, Japan and Sweden? What happens when innovation partners have an
interest in securing key technologies without contributing equal effort or sharing
gains from commercialization, but cannot rely on sophisticated contractual agree-
ments enforced by unbiased local courts? How can entrepreneurs gain assurance that
the risks of opportunism and expropriation of intellectual property are outweighed by
the gains from cooperation? As one entrepreneur we interviewed reasoned: ‘If we
were in the USA, we would not need to work so hard to protect ourselves, because
you can rely on intellectual property rights. Here, if you have a very good idea, before
you start business, you must worry about someone copying from you. The legal
system is just not good enough to protect intellectual property rights’.
Clearly, weak enforcement of contract law and intellectual property rights pose
severe challenges in China, and justify the question as to what extent inter-ﬁrm
cooperation can offer a viable option to produce similar cooperation gains to those
observed in developed economies? In inter-ﬁrm R&D collaboration, what are the
mechanisms that safeguard joint investments in intellectual property from the risks of
opportunism and expropriation, and thus enable increasing utility from inter-ﬁrm
collaboration? We identify mutually reinforcing mechanisms contributing to
increases in utility of inter-ﬁrm cooperation in research and development. These
mechanisms help to reduce the costs of research and development assumed by a
single ﬁrm, and also lower the risks of malfeasance and expropriation.
First, collocation of ﬁrms in industrial clusters where overlapping networks of
ﬁrms are geographically concentrated enables ﬁrms to beneﬁt from network effects
that build up to higher levels of innovative activity. Network effects are evident when
the likelihood that people will adopt a novel practice is an increasing function of the
number or proportion of others in the social network who have already adopted the
practice (DiMaggio and Garip, 2012). Such effects are generated through increases in
the utility of inter-ﬁrm collaboration for advances in research and development.
In industrial clusters, owing to the close spatial proximity of economic actors,
network effects have a direct impact. The greater the percentage of ﬁrms involved in
innovative activity, the higher a ﬁrm’s probability of social learning and experience
in collaborative R&D.
Spatial concentration leads to higher frequency of multiplex relationships and
stronger network effects in the diffusion of good ideas and innovative practices.
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Three mechanisms – local network externalities, social learning, normative inﬂuence
– drive network effects (DiMaggio and Garip, 2012). All have more immediate and
direct effects through spatial concentration in industrial clusters.
(1) Local network externalities are apparent when the utility of cooperation
strategies in innovative activity increases as more entrepreneurs adopt this
practice. As innovative activity becomes commonplace, more and more entre-
preneurs in the private manufacturing economy adopt the practice of inter-ﬁrm
cooperation as a strategic choice.
(2) Social learning occurs when members of entrepreneurial networks share
information on the utility of cooperation strategies in innovation.
(3) Lastly, normative inﬂuence works through side incentives of bestowing social
rewards on adopters of cooperative R&D arrangements and social sanctions on
opportunism and malfeasance in collaborative research and development.
Collocation and clustering are central facilitators of economic cooperation. In the
Yangzi Delta region, a self-reinforcing dynamic of industrial cluster formation is at
the root of a cumulative growth process. In the three provinces of the Yangzi Delta
region – Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Shanghai – extensive multilateral clusters of private
ﬁrms self-organized in industrial niches provide the institutional matrix of competi-
tive advantage. The industrial cluster is deﬁned as a sectoral and spatial concentration
of ﬁrms connected through vertical or horizontal relations (Marshall, 1920; Porter,
1990; Krugman, 1991). A deﬁning feature of industrial clusters is that ﬁrms in a
niche are interconnected entities that compete and cooperate in spatially proximate
locations. Industrial clusters not only improve information ﬂows, but social processes
embedded in networks lock in business norms sustaining trust and cooperation within
close-knit communities of manufacturers.
In the Yangzi Delta region, it was the rapid entry of new private start-up ﬁrms and
bottom-up formation of integrated ‘industrial clusters’ (chanye jiqun) and ‘produc-
tion chains’ (chanyelian) of specialty suppliers which allowed private producers to
cooperate and accept risks not fully covered by contractual agreements. Through
mutual cooperation and joint problem solving, private producers reduced environ-
mental uncertainties and enhanced strategic capability development.
Collocation in industrial clusters allows entrepreneurs to internalize the costs of
research and development through joint participation and cost sharing in innovative
activities. The cluster becomes a geographically concentrated production market for
the industrial niche, with upstream suppliers and downstream distributors within
close reach and the economy of scale to compete in global and domestic markets. The
diffusion of innovation in these clusters depends on social interaction and geographic
proximity of market participants. Learning how others detect and realize market
opportunities is an essential lesson that is greatly affected by ongoing social
interactions of market players. Entrepreneurs carefully analyze the factors for success
and failure for innovative activities by talking about the experience of other market
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players in their industry. Similarly, entrepreneurs learn through direct observation
and face-to-face consultation with others on how to create new ideas.
Geographic proximity facilitates mutual monitoring, information sharing and the
rise of social norms that limit the risk of malfeasance and contract breach. As self-
reproducing social structures of ﬁrms arrayed in a network, production markets are
more close-knit than White’s (2002) accounts of the geographically dispersed
production markets of North America. In industrial clusters, economic transactions
are guided informally by mechanisms regulated by ongoing social relationships.
Malfeasance and contract breach within dense business networks are quickly made
public through gossip and other forms of community sanction. Entrepreneurs aiming
to establish sustainable businesses in their local community are thus naturally tied to
a certain code of conduct, which limits the moral hazard problem involved in inter-
ﬁrm collaborations. Only 5 per cent of respondents in our 2012 survey reported
business conﬂicts with suppliers or customers. Moreover, every second respondent
was certain that she would learn about any conﬂicts between her suppliers or
customers with any other company in the region. Lastly, cross-cutting multiplex
relationships of spatially concentrated entrepreneurs, suppliers and distributors
encourage the endogenous emergence of social norms and conventions that enable
cooperation and trust (Granovetter, 1985; Coleman, 1988; Ellickson, 1991; Portes
and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Uzzi, 1996; Nee and Ingram, 1998; Watts, 1999; Burt,
2004).
In sum, collocation and network effects jointly reduce the costs of innovation and
increase the utility of cooperation in innovative activity by facilitating local network
externalities, social learning of innovative activity, and normative inﬂuence. These
social mechanisms lead to an alleviation of resource constraints in private manufac-
turing ﬁrms that lack the legitimacy to gain access to government-sponsored funds
for research and development. Local role models provide the scripts, myths and
norms that highlight cooperation and mutual learning as an essential feature of
innovative activity. These mechanisms embedded in the emergent private production
markets have shaped incentives and opportunity, which jointly enabled the rapid
development of innovative activities outside the state-controlled mainstream
economy.
Where Good Ideas Come From
Following the folk wisdom of entrepreneurs in the region that even small innovations
can make a difference, it has become commonplace for ﬁrms to introduce new
products, product upgrades, production processes and organizational innovations to
improve their proﬁt margin (see Table 1). The sheer frequency of innovative
activities suggests that private entrepreneurs in the Yangzi Delta region have
successfully developed a culture of innovation. Though patentable innovations
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are still rare, around 60 per cent of ﬁrms reported that they had introduced new
production processes and more than 50 per cent had introduced new products in each
of the three surveys. While most manufacturers make only marginal improvements
and modiﬁcations to existing products and product lines, some continuously
expanded or modiﬁed their main line of business, and developed new product lines
as a strategy to move into less crowded niches offering higher proﬁt margins. In these
cases, the ﬁrm made bold technological shifts that requiring substantial investments
in research and development.
In industrial clusters, innovators and new market entrants beneﬁt from local
network externalities stemming from imitation and learning. The visible and frequent
entry of newcomers into open markets serves as a motivational force to innovate.
Entrepreneurs who successfully bring new products to the market serve as role
models, attracting more entrepreneurial talent into emergent production markets. In
periods of explosive founding of private ﬁrms, local business culture even generates
a social movement dynamic to join in entrepreneurial endeavors and to innovate.
Some of our interviewees conﬁrmed that social pressure and general expectations to
come up with new ideas to compete successfully in the market are a widely-held
norm of entrepreneurial action. In our 2012 survey, entrepreneurs who regularly
develop new products or product upgrades self-assessed their own status higher than
entrepreneurs without novel products (based on statistical mean comparison test).
A distinctive trait of innovative activity in private manufacturing is its strong
market orientation focusing on applied solutions serving the speciﬁc needs and
wishes of customers. Customer orientation is not just an important component in
developing distribution networks and building a loyal customer base, it also helps to
steer innovative activities toward marketable solutions with robust demand. Long-
term customers constantly request quality improvements and cost reductions. This
often requires adjustments and modiﬁcations to the production process and
Table 1: Firm innovation between 2003 and 2011, in per cent
Type of Innovation performed In 2003–2005 In 2006–2008 In 2009–2011
Process innovation 62 66 60
Introduce new product 58 52 58
New management technique 65 64 48
New quality control 61 41 34
Upgrade existing product line 50 41 32
Discontinue at least one product line 22 15 11
New patent approved NA 5 0.8
New joint venture with foreign partner 20 7 0.5
Outsource major production activity 24 5 0.2
Source:Yangzi Delta Private Entrepreneur and Firm Survey 2006, 2009, 2012. Seventy ﬁve per cent of the
ﬁrms participating in the ﬁnal survey wave also responded in Wave 1 or 2.
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improvements of quality management to guarantee certain product standards.
Customer-driven innovation goes beyond mere quality concerns. Through observa-
tional research, entrepreneurs develop new ideas for product improvements.
Clearly, not all of these ideas lead to innovation. Some never go beyond imitation.
Nonetheless, customer-oriented R&D often leads to real innovation. In our 2012
survey, 87 per cent of the interviewed managers ranked customer ideas among the
three most important sources for new ideas (see Table 2). About 51 per cent of
managers looked to companies in their own industry for new ideas. Notwithstanding,
there is an important dissimilarity between mimicking or imitating the innovations of
competitors, and the customer orientation of innovative activity. Customer orienta-
tion usually entails a proactive effort to anticipate the demand for novelty, although
entrepreneurs who mimic or imitate their competitors’ innovations naturally position
themselves as technology followers. Ideas for proactive changes also come from the
network of suppliers, who provide additional sources for new ideas. About 33 per
cent of the surveyed managers in 2012 indicated that their suppliers serve as one of
the most important sources for ideas.
Conferences and trade fairs, showcasing new domestic and global developments in
speciﬁc industries and niche markets, provide a complementary institutionalized
platform that allows producers to test their ideas and receive immediate customer
responses. Trade fairs also facilitate inter-ﬁrm comparisons and help identify future
market trends. New technical and industry standards provide additional incentives
and ideas to bring new products and production processes in line with national
regulation. Particularly, environmental standards play an important role in guiding
developmental trends within particular market segments. Various automobile-parts
producers pointed to the important role of environmental standards when it comes to
innovation. In total, 22 per cent of all interviewees regarded technical and industry
standards as one of the three most important sources for new ideas in 2012.
Table 2: Top external sources for new ideas (in per cent)
Listed among top three sources for ideas of innovation 2006–2008 2009–2011
Customers 82 87
Other businesses in own industry 50 51
Suppliers 30 33
Conferences or trade fairs 29 23
Technical or industry standards 31 22
Universities, research institutes, research services 8 10
Industry association 7 7
Businesses in other industries 8 5
Books and scientiﬁc journals 8 5
Overseas/international companies 5 5
Government assistance 3 2
Source: Yangzi Delta Private Entrepreneur and Firm Survey, 2009 and 2012.
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Forms of R&D Cooperation
The crucial role of inter-ﬁrm collaborations in R&D is well-understood in developed
knowledge-based economies (Powell et al, 1996). But in the context of China’s
emerging-market economy, entrepreneurs not only are challenged by relational risks
associated with long-term collaborative efforts across organizational boundaries
(Ring and Van de Ven, 1992), but they also confront uncertainties stemming from
weak contract enforcement, high litigation costs and inconsistent enforcement of
court rulings. In response to institutional uncertainties, entrepreneurs have devised a
differentiated portfolio of cooperative arrangements, both informal and formal, that
encompass a broad spectrum of organizational contexts.
Informal collaboration
Industrial clusters provide fertile grounds for the development of informal technol-
ogy collaborations. A manifestation of network effects in industrial clusters is the
rapid exchange of ideas, the frequency of joint search for technical solutions, and the
sharing of equipment needed to engage in innovation as a natural outgrowth of long-
standing and geographically proximate business relationships. In close-knit networks
of entrepreneurs, actors expect mutual help and support. This contributes to sharing
of information about new technologies during the course of casual business talks.
Informal exchange of ideas in networks is often the starting point for joint search for
new technology, novel products and innovative ways to manufacture new products.
Often, network effects contribute to rapid diffusion of novel ideas and techniques that
in turn motivate joint interest in novelty, the collaborative search for novel technical
solutions, and the joint use of equipment for innovative activities. In this sense,
network effects arise as natural outputs of ongoing social relationships, where
expectation of mutual help and support in close-knit networks of entrepreneurs
contributes to social learning. Understanding of the utility of inter-ﬁrm cooperation in
innovation often follows informal discussion in business relationships on the cost-
effectiveness and utility of joint development and acquisition of new technologies.
Another manifestation of network effects is the increasing utility of pooling
resources and skills to jointly develop and advance technical capabilities as a means
to circumvent the high cost of standalone R&D departments. Nearly 80 per cent of
entrepreneurs in the Yangzi region surveyed in 2012 reported that they were engaged
in informal technical collaborations with at least one member ﬁrm in their industrial
cluster.
Informal collaborations often focus on marginal product upgrades, process
developments, and the sharing of new insights on management and quality control,
as well as the initial stage of product developments – typically at an early exploratory
stage, when the speciﬁc tasks, resource needs and potential market value of the
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endeavor cannot even be estimated. They often involve minor improvements in
products and production processes that clearly are far from the Schumpeterian view
of ‘new combinations’. These early-stage collaborative activities are important in that
they allow both partners to assess the quality of their relationship without committing
themselves to a long-term strategic alliance to engage in collaborative development
of new technology or products.
Formal collaboration
Because informal technical cooperation does not provide sufﬁcient protection from
the risks of opportunism and expropriation of intellectual property, it is a form of
inter-ﬁrm cooperation with signiﬁcant limits and downsides. Entrepreneurs seeking
patentable innovations therefore turn to formal technology agreements backed by
contracts that specify ex ante a rational plan of the scope of collaboration and the type
of innovation sought. Such contracts anticipate future contingencies with respect to
assignment of duties, and the rights of the collaborating parties and the distribution of
proﬁts. Formal contracts are typically reached after both parties have been engaged in
an initial exploratory phase, often based on non-contractual agreement.
Formal contractual agreements, like non-contractual agreements in collaborative
technology development, rest on the foundation of ongoing social relationships
where both parties know the partner’s reputation and capabilities for joint technology
development. What legal contracts do is reinforce the trust and cooperation that is
often already in place, and which are the outgrowth of an ongoing business
relationship between cooperating partners. Because intellectual property rights are
weak and easily expropriated, in the Yangzi Delta region entrepreneurs prefer to ﬁnd
their R&D collaborators from within their close business networks. They often rely
on personal introductions and the ﬁne-grained information on reputation for
trustworthiness and technical capabilities of prospective partners gained from their
networks. If a broker is involved in introducing innovation partners, it is in the
interest of the broker to make good recommendations rather than risk losing
reputation and brokerage opportunities. In the Yangzi Delta region, larger ﬁrms have
gradually extended their search for technical and research partnerships beyond their
local business networks.
Entrepreneurs learn to form strategic alliances built on strong intrinsic interest in
contract compliance to provide an additional safeguard against opportunism and
expropriation of intellectual property. A variety of strategic alliances has evolved
for asset-speciﬁc investments in technology and technical capabilities involving
partners who share specialized technology needs. Another form of inter-ﬁrm
cooperation involves partners whose ﬁrms sub-contract for larger ﬁrms, and whose
production capacity is too small to use jointly-developed technology for parallel lines
of production that could be sold to beneﬁt the sub-contractor’s individual ﬁrm. Other
Opper and Nee
292 © 2015 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1472-4782 Asian Business & Management Vol. 14, 4, 283–302
entrepreneurs only enter into joint technology development with another ﬁrm if the
expected time needed to copy the entirety of the innovation would be long enough to
allow the innovators to still capture substantive proﬁts.
In the Yangzi Delta region, entrepreneurs choose from a repertoire of contractual
agreements depending on the technical capability of their ﬁrm and the resource
constraints of contracting parties in joint development of technology:
(1) Larger ﬁrms with weak technical capabilities but strong ﬁnancial resources prefer
to buy patented technologies, often from state-owned enterprises or university-
based research institutes. Frequently, the ﬁrm agrees to pay a certain amount for a
speciﬁed technology design by a contracting ﬁrm or research institute that
specializes in providing R&D services.
(2) Manufacturers looking for technical innovations they need in components used
in their main product line turn to suppliers of specialized products. In such cases,
the manufacturer makes an ex ante contractual commitment to purchase a
minimum volume from the supplier commissioned to develop the component
part, who in turn guarantees not to sell the innovation to a third party. In this type
of technology contract, suppliers often offer to develop the technical speciﬁca-
tions of the component pro bono for the manufacturer.
(3) In long-term technology agreements, entrepreneurs share ﬁnancial costs of
research and development by establishing joint ventures solely to engage in
R&D. These arrangements generally involve private ﬁrms with in-house R&D
departments with the technical capability to form strategic alliances to share the
ﬁnancial and technical costs of R&Dwith a domestic or international company to
gain access to state-of-the-art technologies. The quid pro quo for the more
advanced technology ﬁrm is to gain market access in product niches difﬁcult to
penetrate and future proﬁts. The increasing utility of this form of inter-ﬁrm
cooperation has led to the diffusion of this practice. Many of the larger
manufacturing ﬁrms in the Yangzi Delta region have formed strategic alliances
in technology development and transfers with international companies.
Network effects driven by the increasing utility of formal forms of joint
technology development have led ﬁrms without in-house R&D units to enter into
contractual agreements for cooperative technology development. Twelve per cent of
ﬁrms lacking R&D departments interviewed in the 2012 survey wave reported that
they have formal technology agreements with another ﬁrm. Twenty per cent of the
companies with R&D departments entered into technology agreements. Overall, the
700 private manufacturing ﬁrms in our sample reported a broad portfolio of R&D
strategies (see Table 3). Thirty two per cent of the private manufacturers surveyed in
2012 have neither in-house R&D facility nor any R&D agreements, but 32 per cent
relied exclusively on in-house R&D, and the remaining 36 per cent used a
combination of in-house research and various forms of inter-ﬁrm alliances. (Figure 1)
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We compared the innovation strategies reported by CEOs of the 700 ﬁrms in our
sample to provide evidence for the range of informal and formal technology
cooperation used by private manufacturers in the Yangzi Delta region. Companies
that rely on more than one innovation strategy tend to introduce more innovation than
those who only rely on in-house R&D, as evidenced in our innovation index (ranging
from 0 to 4), which combines the number of distinct innovation types (new patent,
new product, product upgrade, new production process) developed between 2009
and 2011 (Figure 2). Signiﬁcantly, companies without in-house R&D introduce more
innovations than companies with in-house R&D facilities, through cooperative
arrangements involving both informal and formal research collaborations. The
highest innovation score is achieved by manufacturing ﬁrms that rely on a mix of
in-house R&D and formal and informal collaborations with other ﬁrms. This ﬁnding
underscores the importance of an innovation strategy that can ﬂexibly adapt to the
Table 3: Portfolio of R&D strategies (n= 700)
Yes No
Informal technology collaboration with key network node 164 536
Formal R&D contracts (with universities, research institutes, or ﬁrms) 111 589
In-house R&D department/R&D activities 352 348
Source: Yangzi Delta Private Entrepreneur and Firm Survey, 2012.
Figure 1: Distribution of innovation portfolio.
Source: Yangzi delta private entrepreneur and ﬁrm survey, 2012.
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uncertainties and risks of a complex institutional environment undergoing transfor-
mative change.
The Effect of Innovation Strategies on Firm Innovativeness
For a more thorough conﬁrmation of the suggested link between a diversiﬁed
portfolio of formal and informal collaborative strategies and distinct innovation
outcomes in China’s transformative private enterprise economy, we rely on the
Yangzi Delta Private Entrepreneur and Firm Survey conducted three times since
2006 (see Nee and Opper, 2012). Seven hundred randomly sampled companies
located in seven cities (Shanghai, Nanjing, Nantong, Changzhou, Hangzhou,
Wenzhou and Ningbo) and operating in ﬁve manufacturing sectors, representing the
region’s key economic activities ranging from labor-intensive to technology-
intensive production (textile, automobile and parts, ordinary machinery, pharmaceu-
tical, and electronics and communication devices), participated in each survey wave
(75 per cent of the companies participated multiple times).1 For the purpose of this
analysis we focused on the most recent survey conducted in 2012, as it presents the
most ﬁne-grained information on collaborative R&D activities. A sample breakdown
by city and sector for the participating ﬁrms is provided in Appendix A.
The private manufacturers in our sample had all been in business for more than
3 years, and employed at least 10 salaried workers. The average ﬁrm age in 2012 was
Figure 2: Number of innovation types (1–4).
Source: Yangzi delta private entrepreneur and ﬁrm survey, 2012.
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12 years. On average, companies employed 133 workers with the largest ﬁrm
employing 2150. Only CEOs (professional CEOs or owner CEOs) were invited to
participate, an important feature that guarantees comparable and reliable information
across the entire sample. All interviews were conducted by professional interviewers
in face-to-face interviews on the company premises. The survey questionnaire
covered a broad range of questions ranging from governance to ownership and
performance measures. An entire section was devoted to a ﬁrm’s innovation activities
and strategies.
To test our claim that entrepreneurs have developed a diversiﬁed portfolio of
collaborative strategies for speciﬁc innovation projects, we explored four distinct
dependent variables, each captured as a binary measure of the occurrence of a distinct
innovation type over the preceding 3-year period (2009–2011).
First, we asked about a ﬁrm’s patenting activities. Because new patents were
reported by only 8 per cent of the ﬁrms in the sample, we did not further differentiate
the type of patents received. We note that the majority of these patents were awarded
for design and utility models, suggesting an early stage in innovative activity for
private ﬁrms in the Yangzi Delta region. Further, we include self-reported measures
of whether companies have introduced new products, upgraded new production
lines/products, or introduced new production processes or technical process
innovations.
Our model examines inter-ﬁrm cooperation in innovation strategies. We capture
with a binary variable the existence of in-house R&D facilities and existence of
formal R&D agreements between the ﬁrm and research institutes, universities or
other companies. Although we have ﬁne-grained information on collaboration
partners, we decided not to differentiate between different types of partners. The
focal point of our analysis is on the effectiveness of partnership agreements, rather
than the comparative value of different strategic alliances. Finally, we use a binary
measure to capture whether the CEO maintained an informal technology exchange/
collaboration with the most highly valued business contact. Since most companies
reported informal technology contacts (with at least one partner in their extended
network), we chose to focus on the most highly valued informal partnership. Control
variables include the total number of employees, number of in-house R&D staff,
existence of any formal agreements to license in patents or trademarks, ﬁrm age, ﬁrm
size measured by total assets, industrial sector and city location (for descriptive
statistics, see Appendix B).
Table 4 summarizes results from probit estimations with robust standard errors
clustered on city. A few observations stand out, and consistently underscore our
narrative of the importance of collaborative research in China’s Yangzi Delta region.
We ﬁnd that both formal and informal R&D collaboration matter. For larger
innovation projects, such as new patents and the introduction of entirely new
products, the probability of successful project completion increases for companies
with formal R&D agreements. In tacit improvements, such as upgrades of products or
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production lines, and the introduction of new production processes and production
technologies, companies with informal R&D exchange report higher probabilities of
success. This conﬁrms the suggested specialization effect in the choice of R&D
portfolios. In-house R&D presents an advantage for patenting and product develop-
ment, but remains an insigniﬁcant factor for product upgrades and process
innovations. In comparison of effect size, we show that formal R&D contracts have
an even stronger impact than in-house R&D facilities when it comes to patenting
activities.
Turning attention to the set of control variables, a few observations are worth
noting. First, as may be expected, the size of in-house R&D departments appears to
affect innovation outcomes, although not in the case of patenting activities. Further,
companies with licensing agreements seem to be more successful in patenting
activities and product upgrades. This may suggest the presence of modest spillover
effects, although similar effects are not statistically signiﬁcant for new product
developments or process innovations. Lastly, ﬁrm size (measured by total number of
employees and total assets) is generally not associated with a ﬁrm’s likelihood to
successfully complete innovation projects. This suggests a highly competitive private
Table 4: Formal R&D contract, informal collaboration and in-house R&D










−0.321 (0.216) −0.020 (0.149) 0.243** (0.109) 0.312*** (0.108)
Formal R&D contract 0.985*** (0.252) 0.456* (0.264) 0.108 (0.127) −0.040 (0.211)
Own R&D department 0.781*** (0.288) 0.801*** (0.082) -0.138 (0.176) −0.057 (0.174)
Controls
Total employees (log) 0.053 (0.161) 0.115 (0.074) 0.084 (0.128) 0.125 (0.087)




0.939*** (0.311) 0.127 (0.410) 0.650** (0.267) 0.196 (0.242)
Firm age (log) −0.223* (0.132) −0.059 (0.154) 0.249** (0.098) 0.156 (0.101)
Total assets (log) 0.026 (0.106) −0.019 (0.073) −0.029 (0.089) −0.028 (0.071)
Sector YES** YES** YES*** YES*
City YES*** YES*** YES*** YES***
Constant −2.737*** (0.631) −1.122** (0.464) −1.248** (0.620) −0.824** (0.408)
Observations 698 698 698 698
Pseudo R2 0.310 0.219 0.088 0.052
Source: Yangzi Delta Private Entrepreneur and Firm Survey, 2012.
Note: *P<0.10, **P<0.05, ***P<0.01 (two-tailed tests); robust (heteroskedastic-consistent) standard
errors clustered on city in parentheses.
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manufacturing economy in which no ﬁrm has secured sufﬁcient market position to
dominate the innovation process in their manufacturing niche.
A general concern in cross-sectional estimation strategies is the risk of reverse
causality. On the basis of the rich pool of qualitative interviews, however, we are
relatively certain that cooperative agreements are available to companies independent
of their proven track record in terms of R&D. This is also in line with the observation
that many companies maintain formal or informal inter-ﬁrm collaborations, but are
not able to maintain their own in-house R&D facilities. Finally, reporting errors are
likely to plague any self-reported measures to some extent. In our case, however,
comparison with earlier survey waves gives some conﬁdence in the validity of
results, as use of earlier survey data generates ﬁndings similar to those presented here
(Nee and Opper, 2012).
Conclusion
Organizational research has long emphasized the importance of inter-ﬁrm collabora-
tions in innovation activities. Little research, however, has explored inter-ﬁrm
alliances in R&D activities when the institutional environment lacks the intellectual
property rights protection of advanced economies. Our study underscores that
successful inter-ﬁrm cooperation is possible even if the context is characterized by
tight ﬁnancial constraints and weak enforcement of intellectual property rights.
Collaborative research within dense industrial clusters has enabled China’s private
companies to gradually climb up the technology ladder, in spite of formidable
institutional barriers set up by policymakers to safeguard the economic dominance of
state-owned and state-controlled industrial enterprise. Through bottom-up entrepre-
neurial activities and the gradual development of norms of cooperation, private ﬁrms
have been able to enter the top echelon of China’s economy, gradually acquiring
market shares from national giant corporations.
Our study of private ﬁrms in the Yangzi Delta region provides insights into
mechanisms enabling the rise of innovation-driven capitalism when formal protec-
tion of property rights is either weak or even absent. It was the development and use
of bottom-up institutional arrangements within close-knit groups of like-minded
actors which provided the necessary funding and reliable business norms to venture
into highly risky research activities. In geographically concentrated industrial
districts, network effects from the increasing utility of innovative activities for
competitive advantage spurred bottom-up institutional innovations, while enabling
cooperation in R&D allowed entrepreneurs to build an autonomous capability in
innovation.
Importantly, the emerging portfolio of cooperative activities allowed entrepreneurs
to participate in innovation activities independent of their resource conditions, size,
and distinct technological needs. Embedded in close-knit social structures of
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industrial clusters, China’s start-up entrepreneurs have been able to develop a broad
portfolio of cooperative tools and corresponding inter-ﬁrm agreements, both formal
and informal, that reﬂects the different technological needs and capabilities at
different stages of ﬁrm development. In this way, innovation, broadly deﬁned as the
introduction of new processes and products, early became part of the general
entrepreneurial culture, which in turn fostered and facilitated the emergence of
globally competitive clusters of industrial production.
Our account has implications going beyond the immediate application presented
here, and offers a broader theoretical lesson for understanding the relationship
between network effects and economic development.
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Note
1 For a more detailed account of the longitudinal survey effort, sampling strategy and questionnaire
design, refer to www.capitalism-from-below.com.
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Table A1: The sample by sector and city
City Textile Pharma Machinery Transport Electronics Total
Shanghai 19 18 9 7 46 99
Nanjing 12 30 15 6 37 100
Nantong 30 29 13 12 16 100
Changzhou 19 28 23 20 10 100
Hangzhou 36 24 13 20 8 101
Wenzhou 26 32 18 2 22 100
Ningbo 30 27 11 10 22 100
Total 172 188 102 77 161 700
Table B1: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables
N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Informal technology collaboration 698 0.235 0.424 0 1
Formal R&D contract 698 0.159 0.366 0 1
In-house R&D facilities 698 0.504 0.500 0 1
Number of R&D staff 698 2.507 2.804 0 30
Total employees (log) 698 4.335 0.963 1.792 7.673
Firm age (log) 698 2.391 0.436 0 3.401
Total Assets (log) 698 6.830 1.203 2.996 11.608
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